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Summary 
The presumption of parental liability is an important tool for the Commission, enabling it to 
hold parent companies jointly and severally liable with their subsidiaries. Parent companies 
claim however, that they cannot rebut the presumption and are thus rendered strictly liable for 
their subsidiaries’ conduct. Due to the fact that parent companies repeatedly failed rebutting 
the presumption with evidence based arguments, they have changed their approach. Thus, 
parent companies started bringing appeals, claiming that their right to a fair trial was violated. 
This gave rise to a general debate regarding the compatibility of competition law proceedings, 
and in particular the presumption of parental liability, with Article 6 ECHR. This question has 
become increasingly interesting in the light of the CFREU and the possible future accession 
of the EU to the ECHR. 
 
Abbreviations 
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1. Preface 
This essay will be focused on the presumption of parental liability, which in EU competition 
law proceedings is frequently used to hold parent companies liable for their subsidiaries 
competition law infringements. Moreover, this essay will also examine the need for full 
judicial review, based on the fact that parent companies have consistently encountered 
difficulties in rebutting the presumption. For that purpose the essay will be based on the 
recent ECJ case of Alliance One International Inc. v European Commission. The case will be 
used to disclose the relationship between the presumption of parental liability and the 
requirement of full judicial review, which is protected under the fundamental right to a fair 
trial. 
First the relevant legal background will be introduced. The legal background presented will 
include Article 101 TFEU and Article 6 ECHR and the relevant case law of the CJEU and 
ECtHR, respectively. Moreover, the aforementioned case of Alliance One International Inc. v 
European Commission will be presented. First of all, the section on Article 101 will focus on 
the notion of “undertaking”, the single economic unit doctrine and the presumption of 
parental liability. Secondly, the section regarding Article 6 ECHR will introduce the relevant 
case law of the ECtHR as to the extent of Article 6. Moreover, the relationship between the 
ECHR and the CFREU will be elaborated on. Thirdly, the case of Alliance One International 
Inc. v European Commission will be introduced. This section will focus on the Commission’s 
decision, the relevant corporate groups and AOI’s appeals to the GC and ECJ. It has to be 
noted that throughout this essay I relied heavily on my previous case note on the case Alliance 
One International Inc. v European Commission, especially with regards to the legal and 
factual matters surrounding the case and the presumption of parental liability. 
After the establishment of the legal background, an analysis of the presumption of parental 
liability and the requirement of full judicial review will be conducted under consideration of 
the AOI case. First, the relevant legal questions concerning the presumption in general as well 
as the questions arising from AOI will be outlined. Secondly, rebuttable nature of the 
presumption of parental liability will be analyzed under consideration of exemplary case law. 
Thereafter, the need for full judicial review in light of the presumption in general and the AOI 
case in particular will be discussed. 
Lastly, a conclusion regarding the presumption and the requirement of judicial review will be 
submitted. Throughout the concluding statement the opinion of the author will be voiced. 
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2. Legal Background 
In the following the relevant legal background for the discussion of the presumption of 
parental liability will be introduced. The legal background that will be introduced includes 
Article 101 TFEU and its implications, as well as the single economic unit doctrine and the 
presumption of parental liability. Thereafter, the reader will be introduced to the case C-
679/11 Alliance One International v Commission, around which the discussion of the 
presumption of parental liability will revolve. 
2.1 Article 101 
Article 101 TFEU, formerly Article 81 TEC, sets out a prohibition of any form of agreements 
between undertakings which may affect trade within the EU and which have either an anti-
competitive object or effect on the internal market. Furthermore, Article 101(2) TFEU 
automatically voids any agreement fulfilling the aforementioned criteria.
1
 
Article 23 of Regulation 1/2003, on the implementation of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, 
provides the Commission with the power to impose fines on undertakings and associations of 
undertakings which infringe the aforementioned provisions.
2
 
2.1.1 The notion of “undertaking” under Article 101 
The meaning of the term “undertaking” under Article 101 TFEU was defined neither in the 
TEC nor in the TFEU. Thus, the term was gradually defined through the jurisprudence of the 
CJEU. In Höfner the ECJ defined the term “undertaking” as an economic entity which covers 
any entity, regardless of the legal status thereof, as long as it is carrying out any form of 
economic activity.
3
 Thus, factors such as the legal status of an entity, the way it is financed 
and even whether or not its economic activity is profitable, do not affect whether the entity in 
question constitutes an “undertaking” pursuant to Article 101 TFEU.4 In doing so the ECJ 
adopted an economic approach to the notion of an “undertaking”, rather than following 
factors which, in most national law systems of member states, constitute core elements of the 
notion of corporate legal persons. The Commission, in its decision in Akzo, acknowledged the 
                                                 
1
 Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [TFEU], Consolidated Version (OJ 2012 C 
326/88). 
2
 Article 23 of Council Regulation 1/2003/EC of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on 
competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty (OJ L 1, 4.1.2003, p. 20). 
3
 Höfner v Macrotron (C-41/90) [1991] E.C.R. I-1979, para. 21. 
4
 Höfner v Macrotron (C-41/90) [1991] E.C.R. I-1979, para. 21. 
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fact that the notion of “undertaking” in EU competition law does not follow national law 
approaches towards corporate legal persons.
5
  
Moreover, the ECJ opened up the notion of “undertaking” to include parent companies with 
their subsidiaries as part of the same economic entity. In Commercial Solvents the ECJ ruled 
that a parent company and its subsidiary constituted one economic entity and consequently 
fell within the scope of one “undertaking” under Article 101 TFEU.6 Even the separate legal 
personality of a subsidiary, as a legal entity separate from its parent company, did not ensure, 
in the eyes of the court, to a sufficient degree of certainty, that the subsidiary determined its 
conduct individually and therefore, should be held responsible for that conduct individually as 
well.
7
 The court argued that the possibility of attributing responsibility for the subsidiary’s 
conduct to its parent company could not be excluded based merely on the fact that the 
subsidiary had a separate legal personality.
8
 While explaining this approach, the ECJ referred 
to market conduct as a decisive factor, as it stated in ICI.
9
 The court held that unity of market 
conduct overrides the separation between parent company and subsidiary, which is based on 
their separate legal personalities, in order to apply the rules on competition effectively.
10
 
Consequently, parent companies and subsidiaries, constituting an “undertaking” pursuant to 
Article 101 TFEU, can be held jointly and severally liable under competition rules for the 
conduct of the subsidiary on its respective market. With regards to the liability it has to be 
noted that fines are calculated based upon the turnover of the entire corporate group 
constituting an “undertaking” rather than just on the turnover of the subsidiary.11 
As mentioned in the above, the CJEU and in particular the ECJ did, from an early stage, apply 
a very broad scope to the definition of the term “undertaking” in Article 101 TFEU. For the 
purpose of effectively applying the competition law rules of the EU the court held that 
competition law could override the formal legal separations between parent company and 
subsidiary and opted not to apply national law definitions of corporate legal persons to the 
                                                 
5
 Commission Decision 2005/566/EC of 9 December 2004 relating to a proceeding under Article 81 [EC] and 
Article 53 of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/37.533- Choline chloride), recital 167-176.  
6
 Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano S.p.A. and Commercial Solvents Corporation v. Commission, (Joined Cases 
6/73 & 7/73), [1974] E.C.R. 223. 
7
 Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd v Commission of the European Communities (48/69) [1972] E.C.R. 619, 
paras. 125-132. 
8
 Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd v Commission of the European Communities (48/69) [1972] E.C.R. 619, 
paras. 125-132. 
9
 Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd v Commission of the European Communities (48/69) [1972] E.C.R. 619, para. 
11. 
10
 Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd v Commission of the European Communities (48/69) [1972] E.C.R. 619, 
para. 11. 
11
 Paul Hughes, Competition law enforcement and corporate group liability - adjusting the veil, E.C.L.R. 2014, 
35(2), 68-87, p. 13. 
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term “undertaking”. Thus, the Commission is not limited to investigating and fining 
subsidiaries for their respective competition law infringements but can hold parents and 
subsidiaries jointly and severally liable. This approach can be attributed to the complex and 
international organization of corporate groups. These complex corporate structures require a 
broad “catch-all” kind of mechanism in order to enable the Commission to effectively enforce 
competition law and to prevent those corporate groups from escaping liability by making their 
subsidiaries their scapegoats. Ultimately, the notion of an “undertaking” has to be understood 
in conjunction with the purpose Article 101 TFEU serves, which is the effective control and 
regulation of competition within the internal market of the EU.  
The aforementioned line of case law constitutes the basis for the so called single economic 
unit doctrine which will be elaborated on in the following. 
2.1.2 Single economic unit doctrine 
Over the years the ECJ and GC followed the line of case law which had been established in 
Höfner, Commercial Solvents and ICI, amongst others. In Bodson the ECJ held that a 
corporate group may constitute a single economic unit and hence an “undertaking” for the 
purpose of Article 101 TFEU, if the subsidiary “[…] has no real freedom to determine its 
course of action on the market, […]”.12 However, the ECJ also held that parent companies and 
subsidiaries do not automatically constitute a single economic unit solely based on being part 
of the same corporate group.
13
 Therefore, other factors, such as personnel overlaps and 
directions from the parent company as well as commercial conduct on the market, have to be 
considered to determine whether or not the companies in question constitute a single 
economic unit. The ECJ, in Viho, reaffirmed the Bodson ruling. The court held that a wholly 
owned subsidiary and its parent company constitute a single economic unit, if the subsidiary 
lacks the freedom to determine its commercial conduct on the market due to the fact that it is 
determined by the parent company.
14
 Furthermore, companies are considered to form a single 
economic unit and hence an “undertaking” under Article 101 TFEU, if the parent company 
exercises decisive influence over the subsidiary.
15
 The concept of single economic unity being 
based upon the exercise of decisive influence was codified in the Commission guidelines on 
the applicability of Article 101 TFEU.
16
 Even before the ECJ’s decision in Viho, the GC had, 
                                                 
12
 Bodson v SA Pompes Funèbres des Régions Libérées SA (30/87) [1988] E.C.R. 2479, paras. 19-20. 
13
 Bodson v SA Pompes Funèbres des Régions Libérées SA (30/87) [1988] E.C.R. 2479, paras. 20. 
14
 Viho Europe BV v Commission of the European Communities (C-73/95 P) [1996] E.C.R. I-5457, para. 51. 
15
 Viho Europe BV v Commission of the European Communities (C-73/95 P) [1996] E.C.R. I-5457, para. 51. 
16
 Guidelines on the applicability of Art.101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to 
horizontal co-operation agreements [2011] (OJ C11/1), para. 11. 
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in the same case, already reaffirmed the aforementioned ICI ruling, by holding that unity of 
market conduct overrides the legal separation between parent company and subsidiary, based 
on their respective legal personalities.
17
  
However, in contrast to the ruling in Viho, where the subsidiary had been wholly owned, the 
ECJ in Commercial Solvents held that even a parent company which owned only 51% of its 
subsidiaries’ shares fell in the scope of the single economic unit doctrine, given the fact that 
there were noteworthy personnel overlaps between the two companies in addition to the 
shares.
18
 In the case of Dow and Du Pont the two companies each owned 50 % of a joint 
venture and were found to be jointly and severally liable, despite the fact that the companies 
had joint control, and hence neither company had unilateral positive control over the joint 
venture.
19
 Thus, even negative control can render a parent company liable with its subsidiary 
as one single economic unit. The cases of Viho, Commercial Solvents and Dow illustrate how 
far reaching the single economic unit doctrine can be. When comparing these two exemplary 
cases it becomes apparent that the doctrine applies to whole ownership as well as partial or 
joint ownership. Similar to the notion of “undertaking” the courts have, through their case 
law, established a rather broad doctrine.  
As has been set out in the court’s case law, the single economic unit doctrine depends on 
several factors such as unity of market conduct, lack of autonomy of the subsidiary, personnel 
overlaps and most importantly, the exercise of decisive influence. Due to the single economic 
unit doctrine, even subsidiaries of partial or joint owners can form a single economic unit and 
consequently an undertaking under Article 101 TFEU. Therefore, a parent company or parent 
companies, as was the case in Dow, which have the possibility of exercising decisive 
influence over their subsidiary are at an increased risk of being held severally and jointly 
liable as one undertaking under Article 101 TFEU.
20
 
Due to the fact that the single economic unit doctrine overrides the separate legal personalities 
of parent company and subsidiary, the argument has frequently been raised that the doctrine is 
not compatible with the principle of personal responsibility, since not only the entity in breach 
of competition law is personally responsible but also its parent company, which can be held 
                                                 
17
 Viho Europe BV v Commission of the European Communities (T-102/92) [1995] E.C.R. II-17, para. 50. 
18
 Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano S.p.A. and Commercial Solvents Corporation v. Commission, Joined Cases 
6/73 & 7/73, 1974 E.C.R. 223, [1974] 1 C.M.L.R. 309. 
19
 Dow Chemical Co v European Commission (T-77/08) [2012] 4 C.M.L.R. 19, para. 92. 
20
 Paul Hughes, Competition law enforcement and corporate group liability - adjusting the veil, E.C.L.R. 2014, 
35(2), 68-87, p. 2. 
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liable as well.
21
 However, AG Kokott in her opinion in Akzo Nobel reconciled the doctrine 
with the principle. She argued that the principle and the doctrine are compatible, due to the 
fact that the personal responsibility for competition law infringements is attributed to the legal 
person operating the undertaking in breach of EU competition law, namely the parent 
company. Thus, the parent or principal of a single economic unit, which constitutes an 
undertaking under Article 101 TFEU, bears personal responsibility and can therefore be held 
liable for the conduct of the entire economic unit.
22
 This is in stark contrast to corporate law 
in countries with a common law tradition, which is based upon a clear separate personal 
responsibility and limited liability.
23
 
2.1.3 Presumption of parental Liability 
In the case of AEG[-Telefunken], which was decided in 1983, the ECJ already referred to the 
presumption that a parent company that wholly owns a subsidiary exercises decisive influence 
over the conduct of the latter.
24
 As a result of this judgment, the so called presumption of 
parental liability emerged and was throughout the years continuously applied and reaffirmed 
by the Court in recent judgments, such as the rulings in Akzo Nobel (C-97/08 P)
25
, Arkema SA 
(C-520/09 P)
26
, Elf Aquitaine SA (C-521/09 P)
27
. Court decisions, such as the decision of the 
General Court in Areva SA v European Commission (T-117/07), show that the presumption of 
parental liability allows the Commission to rely on a known fact, such as the fact that holding 
100% of a company’s shares gives the parent company the opportunity to exercise decisive 
influence, as proof of an unknown fact, namely whether the parent company holding 100% of 
shares actually exercised decisive influence on the subsidiary.
28
 The presumption follows the 
Court’s jurisprudence and allows the Commission to assume that the criteria for a single 
economic unit, which were set out in judgments like Viho
29
 and Bodson
30
, are fulfilled in 
cases of whole ownership of a subsidiary by its parent company. In Stora the ECJ had 
                                                 
21
 Julian Joshua, Yves Botteman and Laura Atlee, ‘You can’t beat the percentage’ — The Parental Liability 
Presumption in EU Cartel Enforcement , in (Editor not stated) The European Antitrust Review 2012 - a Global 
Competition Review Special Report, available at 
http://www.steptoe.com/assets/htmldocuments/GCR%20The%20Euro%20Antitrust%20Review%202012_Cartel
s_Joshua-Botteman-Atlee.pdf (visited26 May 2014),  p. 4-5. 
22
 Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in Case C-97/08P, Akzo Nobel NV and Others v Commission [2009] 
E.C.R I-8237, para. 39. 
23
 Paul Hughes, Competition law enforcement and corporate group liability - adjusting the veil, E.C.L.R. 2014, 
35(2), 68-87, p. 9. 
24
 AEG Telefunken AG v Commission of the European Communities (107/82) [1983] E.C.R. 3151, para. 52. 
25
 Akzo Nobel v Commission of the European Communities (C-97/08 P) [2009] E.C.R. I-8237, para. 58. 
26
 Arkema SA v Commission of the European Communities (C-520/09 P) [2011] 5 C.M.L.R 30, para. 38. 
27
 Elf Aquitaine SA v European Commission (C-521/09 P) [2011] ECR I-8947, paras. 56, 63. 
28
 Areva SA v European Commission (T-117/07), [2011] 4 C.M.L.R. 26, para. 86. 
29
 Viho Europe BV v Commission of the European Communities (C-73/95 P) [1996] E.C.R. I-5457. 
30
 Bodson v SA Pompes Funèbres des Régions Libérées SA (30/87) [1988] E.C.R. 2479. 
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indicated that the presumption alone, based solely on the possession of all or the majority of 
shares of its subsidiary, in the absence of further evidence, could not be sufficient to hold a 
parent company liable.
31
 However, the ECJ gradually put the approach in Stora into 
perspective and moved away from it.
32
 In Akzo Nobel the ECJ clarified that it was sufficient 
for the Commission to rely solely on the presumption of parental liability, based on the 
possession of shares, for the purpose of holding parent companies jointly and severally liable 
with their subsidiaries as one single economic unit.
33
 Therefore, the Commission is not 
required to take further evidence into consideration when applying the presumption of 
parental liability. The Commission can, however, take further evidence into consideration in 
addition to the presumption, when applying the so called “dual burden test” or “dual basis 
method”. The Commission may choose to apply the aforementioned “dual basis method” in 
order to strengthen their case, by supporting the presumption with additional evidence.
34
 
However, it has to be noted that when applying the “dual burden test” the Commission 
subjects itself to a higher burden of proof, as compared to the presumption of parental 
liability. 
Consequently, the presumption of parental liability allows the Commission to presume that 
parent companies holding around 100% of their subsidiaries shares, exercise decisive 
influence over their market conduct, and therefore constitute a single economic unit that can 
be held jointly and severally liable. Furthermore, the presumption does not require the 
Commission to either prove or check whether the parent company in question actually 
exercises decisive influence, in order to hold a parent company liable for the infringements of 
EU competition law of its subsidiaries. The ECJ considered such checks regarding the actual 
exercise of decisive influence “superfluous” with regards to wholly owned subsidiaries, as can 
be seen in the aforementioned AEG [-Telefunken] judgment.
35
 Consequently, the presumption 
of parental liability relieves the Commission of the burden to prove the exercise of decisive 
influence by parent companies over the market conduct of their subsidiaries. 
                                                 
31
Stora Kopparsberg Bergslags AB v Commission of the European Communities(C-286/98 P) [2001] 4 C.M.L.R. 
12. 
32
 See e.g. Daimler Chrysler AG v Commission of the European Communities (T-325/01) [2005] E.C.R. II-3319; 
Cooperatieve Verkoop- en Productievereniging van Aardappelmeel en Derivaten Avebe BA v Commission (T‑
314/01) [2006] ECR II-3085. 
33
 Akzo Nobel v Commission of the European Communities (C-97/08 P) [2009] E.C.R. I-8237, paras. 61,62. 
34
 Alexander Riesenkampff & Udo Krauthausen, Liability of parent companies for antitrust violations of their 
subsidiaries, E.C.L.R. 2010, 31(1), 38-41, p. 3. 
35
 AEG Telefunken AG v Commission of the European Communities (107/82) [1983] E.C.R. 3151, para. 50. 
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Nonetheless, the presumption remains rebuttable as has been noted by the General Court on 
several occasions, including Areva SA (T-117/07)
36
 and Akzo Nobel (T‑330/01)37. Based on 
these and other judgments of the GC and the ECJ, parent companies are afforded the 
opportunity to rebut the presumption of parental liability, in order to prevent being held 
jointly and severally liable for their subsidiaries conduct. The burden of proof for a rebuttal of 
the presumption lies completely with the parent companies. Thus, the presumption of parental 
liability relieves the Commission of the burden of proof, as mentioned above, by shifting the 
burden of proof to the parent companies, which would have to disprove the exercise of 
decisive influence on their part, in order to rebut the presumption. In Akzo Nobel (C-97/08 
P)
38
 and in Avebe v Commission (T‑314/01)39 the ECJ and GC respectively stated that in 
order to rebut the presumption, a parent company would have to produce “sufficient 
evidence” to establish that its subsidiary was independent and the subsidiary’s conduct can 
therefore not be imputable to the parent company.  
The presumption of parental liability allows the Commission to presume that wholly owned 
subsidiaries are under decisive influence of their parent companies and lack autonomy to 
determine their market conduct independently. Therefore, in line with the case law mentioned 
above, on the notion of an “undertaking” and the single economic unit doctrine, the 
Commission can consider wholly owned subsidiaries and their parent companies to constitute 
a single economic unit without having to prove the exercise of decisive influence by the 
parent company. Subsequently, based on that presumption, the Commission can hold wholly 
owned subsidiaries and their parent companies jointly and severally liable as one single 
economic unit or “undertaking”. However, as has been continuously reiterated by the ECJ in 
Akzo Nobel and other judgments, the presumption is rebuttable. Parent companies would have 
to disprove criteria set out in the Court’s case law. In theory, according to the Court’s 
jurisprudence in cases like Viho
40
, Bodson
41
, ICI
42
 and Akzo Nobel
43
, parent companies would 
need to prove that they do not exercise decisive influence and that their subsidiaries enjoy 
autonomy to determine their market conduct, in order to rebut the presumption of parental 
liability. 
                                                 
36
 Areva SA v European Commission (T-117/07), [2011] 4 C.M.L.R. 26, para. 86. 
37
 Akzo Nobel v Commission (T‑330/01) [2006] E.C.R II-3389, paras. 82-83. 
38
 Akzo Nobel v Commission of the European Communities (C-97/08 P), [2009] E.C.R. I-8237, para. 60. 
39
 Cooperatieve Verkoop- en Productievereniging van Aardappelmeel en Derivaten Avebe BA v Commission (T‑
314/01) [2006] ECR II-3085, para. 136. 
40
 Viho Europe BV v Commission of the European Communities (C-73/95 P) [1996] E.C.R. I-5457. 
41
 Bodson v SA Pompes Funèbres des Régions Libérées SA (30/87) [1988] E.C.R. 2479. 
42
 Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd v Commission of the European Communities (48/69) [1972] E.C.R. 619. 
43
 Akzo Nobel v Commission of the European Communities (C-97/08 P), [2009] E.C.R. I-8237. 
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Theory however, does not always translate into practice as smoothly as it might seem. The 
actual rebuttability of the presumption of parental liability in practice will be discussed at a 
later stage in this essay, under consideration of case law of the CJEU. 
2.2 Article 6 ECHR 
Throughout the years the question of whether competition law proceedings fall within the 
scope of the fundamental right to a fair trial as protected by Article 6 ECHR, has frequently 
been raised. The question will be considered based on the ECtHR’s case law and  the CJEU’s 
case law in the following. Moreover, the relationship between the ECHR and the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union will be analyzed. 
2.2.1 Extent of Article 6 according to the ECtHR 
The ECtHR has in its case law established certain criteria and differentiation concerning 
Article 6 ECHR, which will be presented in the following. First the notion of “criminal 
charges” and whether EU competition law proceedings can be considered to deal with such 
“criminal charges” will be examined. Thereafter, proceedings leading to the imposition of 
fines by administrative bodies, like the European Commission, and the compatibility of such 
proceedings with Article 6 will be discussed, under consideration of the ECtHR’s case law. 
Lastly, the ECtHR’s differentiation of “criminal charges” into hard core criminal charges and 
non-traditional criminal law will be introduced, as well as the implications this distinction 
carries with regards to the application of Article 6 ECHR. Each of those subsections will also 
discuss the implications that the respective ECtHR rulings have with regards to competition 
law proceedings under EU law. 
2.2.2 The notion of “criminal charges” under Article 6 
The text of Article 6 ECHR
44
 refers to “criminal charges” and “criminal offences”, therefore, 
whether or not proceedings fall within the scope of Article 6 depends on the nature or 
classification of an offence. The ECtHR has established its own interpretation as to what 
constitutes “criminal charges”. In Engel the ECtHR established that in determining the nature 
of an offence, it will consider the classification of such an offence under domestic law, the 
specific nature of the offence in itself, and the degree of severity of the punishment.
45
 With 
regards to those criteria it has to be noted that they are not cumulative, thus only one criterion 
has to be fulfilled in order to render a charge “criminal”. Moreover, the ECtHR considers the 
                                                 
44
 Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
45
 Engel v. The Netherlands, ECtHR [1976] Series A, No. 022, para. 82. 
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latter two criteria to carry more importance with regards to the nature of an offence than the 
classification of a charge under domestic law.
46
  
The ECtHR in Bendenoun elaborated on the latter two criteria. The ECtHR concluded that, 
considering the specific nature of an offence, the rule in question has to be generally 
applicable to all citizens equally, in order for an offence to be classified as “criminal”.47 In the 
same judgment the ECtHR held, with regards to the severity of punishment, that if the 
sanction for the infringement of such a generally applicable rule is of a punitive nature, has a 
deterrent effect and carries a degree of stigma, the offence can be considered to be 
“criminal”.48 Based on the aforementioned criteria the ECtHR, in Bendenoun, considered a 
tax surcharge, having both deterrent and punitive character, to render the offence in question 
“criminal” and thus to fall under Article 6(1) ECHR.49  
Even before the judgment in Bendenoun the ECtHR had, based on the Engel-criteria, opened 
up the notion of “criminal charges” to apply to customs and administrative penalties, in the 
cases of Salabiaku
50
 and Öztürk
51
 respectively. In Janosevic, the ECtHR reaffirmed its 
Bendenoun decision in holding that Swedish tax surcharges fell within the notion of 
“criminal” because the penalties were severe, deterrent and punitive.52 Following the 
judgments in Öztürk and Salabiaku, the ECtHR opened up Article 6 ECHR to competition 
law. In the case Societe Stenuit the ECtHR held that French competition law proceedings were 
concerned with a “criminal charge”, due to the fact that competition law like criminal law 
protected the society’s general interest and due to the fact that the fines in French competition 
law clearly had a deterrent character.
53
 In a more recent judgment, with implications regarding 
the EU’s rules of competition law, the ECtHR reaffirmed its decision in Societe Stenuit. In 
Menarini, the ECtHR confirmed that fines imposed under Italian competition law could be 
considered “criminal” given their severity as well as their punitive and deterrent character.54 
The special significance of this case, as compared to the Stenuit case, with regards to EU 
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competition law lies in the fact that Italy shaped its competition law after the EU’s 
competition law.
55
 
Subsequently, EU competition law can be considered to be “criminal” due to the Engel-
criteria. Article 101 TFEU is generally applicable to all undertakings equally, as does 
Regulation 1/2003. Furthermore, competition law protects the general interest of the society 
in a free market competition in the same way in which criminal law protects other general 
interests of the society, as stated in Societe Stenuit.
56
 Most importantly though, the fines 
imposed in EU competition law that can be up to 10% of an undertakings worldwide turnover, 
according to Article 23(2) of Regulation 1/2003,
57
 can be considered to be of a “criminal” 
nature. Due to their severity, those fines have to be considered to have deterrent character, are 
of a punitive nature and attach a stigma to competition law infringements. Moreover, the 
Commission openly aims to achieve effective deterrence by imposing such fines.
58
 In line 
with the ECtHR’s case law in Janosevic, the severity of the fines and their deterrent and 
punitive character are sufficient to render them “criminal” within the meaning of Article 6 
ECHR. As mentioned above, the classification under national law does not carry the same 
weight as the other criteria, thus Article 23(5) of Regulation 1/2003, which states that 
competition law fines in EU law do not have a criminal character, does not invalidate or 
outweigh the aforementioned criteria.
59
 Lastly, the Menarini judgment gave a clear indication 
that Article 6 applies to Italy’s competition law, and thus should apply to the competition law 
of the EU likewise.
60
 Consequently, EU competition law proceedings, which have as their 
objective the imposition of fines, fall within the scope of Article 6 ECHR. 
2.2.3 Imposition of fines by administrative authorities 
The Court of Human Rights, furthermore, had established that administrative authorities may 
prosecute, impose fines and punish infringements in accordance with Article 6 ECHR, if the 
possibility of an effective appeal exists. More specifically, the ECtHR held in Öztürk and 
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Bendenoun that administrative authorities can be entrusted with the prosecution, punishment 
and imposition of fines for infringements, as long as the charged has the possibility of 
effectively appealing the administrative authority’s decision to a judicial body with full 
jurisdiction.
61
 In this context it has to be noted that, following the ECtHR’s argumentation on 
Golder, Article 6 ECHR does not exclusively apply to proceedings in front of the respective 
courts of appeal, but also to the administrative authorities themselves.
62
 
The aforementioned requirement of effectiveness of an appeal is protected under Article 13 
ECHR, the right to an effective remedy.
63
 In practice the ECtHR often does not apply Articles 
6 and 13 in conjunction anymore, due to the fact that the requirement of an effective remedy 
is often dealt with when considering a case under Article 6 already. For example, in the case 
of Mendel, the ECtHR did not examine Article 13, after finding that the applicant was not 
granted the possibility to practically and effectively appeal an administrative decision in 
violation of Article 6(1) ECHR.
64
 
Regarding the requirement of full jurisdiction, the court, in Janosevic, reiterated and stressed 
the fact that full jurisdiction has to include the power to review the facts and law of a case as 
well as the power to quash the administrative body’s decision.65 Furthermore, the ECtHR 
reaffirmed the importance of the full jurisdiction requirement in the recent Menarini 
judgment, as well.
66
 
Consequently, the role of the European Commission in competition law proceedings, as an 
administrative body, which investigates, prosecutes, and imposes fines for infringements, may 
be considered to be compatible with the fair trial principle, protected under Article 6 ECHR, 
as long as the aforementioned criteria are fulfilled. Therefore, the appellant of a Commission 
decision must have an effective right to appeal and the GC and the ECJ, have to have full 
jurisdiction to review the facts and law of competition law cases, in order for the current 
system of EU competition law proceedings to be compatible with Article 6 ECHR. The GC 
does have full jurisdiction in competition law cases according to Articles 261 TFEU and 263 
TFEU
67
 in conjunction with Article 31 of Regulation 1/2003
68
. Moreover, this was reaffirmed 
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in the Cimenteries judgment.
69
 The full jurisdiction requirement, regarding the GC and the 
ECJ, can thus be considered to be fulfilled, despite the fact that they do not make frequent use 
of it.
70
 The possibility of practically and effectively appealing the presumption of parental 
liability will be discussed throughout the analysis of the courts’ case law. 
2.2.4 Hard core- and non-traditional criminal law 
Following the broadening of the notion of “criminal charge” after the introduction of the 
Engel-criteria, the ECtHR, in Jussila
71
 introduced a distinction between different types of 
“criminal charges”.  The court argued that administrative law, customs law, and competition 
law can be considered “criminal” in accordance with the Engel-criteria, but are not 
traditionally in the sphere of criminal law.
72
 The court went on to state that tax surcharges, 
which were the issue in question in Jussila, could not be considered to be part of the hard core 
of criminal law, thus the protections guaranteed in Article 6 ECHR will not necessarily be 
applied with the same stringency as they would be concerning hard core criminal law.
73
  The 
Jussila judgment led to the widespread assumption among legal practitioners and scholars that 
competition law would also fall outside the hard core of criminal law, and thus Article 6 
would not be applied with full stringency with regards to competition law.
74
 However, others 
have argued that competition law could fall within the hard core of criminal law considering 
the severity of competition law fines as compared to the tax surcharges in Jussila.
75
 
Moreover, it has been argued that the ECtHR in Menarini did not determine competition law 
to fall outside the hard core of the notion of “criminal”, as it had done in Jussila.76 Therefore, 
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it can be argued that competition law, based on the severity of its fines and the fact that the 
ECtHR did not declare it to fall outside the hard core of “criminal”, can be considered to fall 
within the hard core under Article 6 ECHR, which would therefore, have to be applied with 
full stringency to competition law cases. 
Consequently it appears to be possible that EU competition law, like the Italian in Menarini, 
would not fall outside the hard core of Article 6 ECHR, due to its severe, deterrent and 
punitive fines. Moreover, it has to be noted that fines under EU competition law, especially 
under consideration of the presumption of parental liability, exceed the fine imposed in 
Menarini considerably, due to the fact that fines up to 10% of an “undertaking’s” global 
turnover may be imposed. The classification of competition law procedures under EU law 
does not however affect the requirement of full judicial review, which in either case has to be 
fulfilled in order for the Commission’s role as investigator, prosecutor and decision making 
authority to be in conformity with Article 6 ECHR.
77
 This argument can be reaffirmed with 
reference to the EFTA Court, which has frequently been a source of inspiration for the ECJ. 
In Postem Norge the court argued that given the severity of the charge and the stigma attached 
to it, a competition law charge could not be considered a “minor” criminal charge.78 
Subsequently, throughout the discussion of the requirement of full jurisdiction and full 
judicial review, in the later part of this essay, no distinction will be made with regards to the 
two categories of “criminal charges”, as that requirement applies to either classification of 
competition law proceedings. This essay will mainly be concerned with the right to fair trial 
under Article 6 ECHR. More specifically, the focus will be put on the full jurisdiction 
requirement and the right to an effective appeal, whereas issues relating to the presumption of 
innocence or the ne bis in idem principle are not going to be discussed with regards to the 
presumption of parental liability.   
2.2.5 ECHR and the CFREU 
As a result of the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
of the European Union [CFREU], which had been drafted in 2000, became binding. Article 
6(1) TEU stipulates that the CFREU shall have the same legal value as the TEU and TFEU, 
                                                 
77
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thus the CFREU does have direct effect like the Treaties.
79
 Moreover, Article 6(3) TEU 
codified that the fundamental rights ECHR protected by the ECHR shall be general principles 
of EU law. This, however, is of minor importance considering the fact that Article 52(3) 
CFREU, which is intended to safeguard consistency between the ECHR and CFREU, 
stipulates that the rights guaranteed in the ECHR shall form the minimum protection afforded 
by the CFREU.
80
 More specifically, Article 52(3) provides rights contained in the CFREU, 
which correspond to rights protected under the ECHR, shall have the same meaning and scope 
as those corresponding ECHR rights. Moreover, AG Trstenjak argued that the reference to the 
ECHR, in Article 52(3) CFREU, is a dynamic reference and thus includes the case law of the 
ECtHR.
81
 Therefore, the right to a fair trial and effective remedy, in Article 47 CFREU, the 
presumption of innocence, in Article 48 CFREU, and the principles of legality and 
proportionality, in Article 49 CFREU, shall have the same meaning and scope as their 
corresponding rights, namely Article 6 ECHR. Furthermore, following AG Trstenjak’s 
argumentation in the N.S. case, even the ECtHR’s case law concerning Article 6 ECHR has to 
be taken into account regarding the scope and meaning of the rights contained therein. 
Nonetheless, it has to be noted that Article 52(3) CFREU does not render the ECHR directly 
applicable, rather the ECJ would have to interpret the CFREU in the light of the ECHR and 
the ECtHR’s case law. 
2.2.6 Article 6 ECHR and the CJEU 
Prior to the CFREU becoming binding, the European Commission as well as the courts of the 
EU, the ECJ and GC, did not share the aforementioned view that the fines imposed by the 
Commission render EU competition law “criminal”. This view was founded on Article 23(5) 
of Regulation 1/2003, which states that the Commission’s fining decisions shall not be of a 
criminal nature.
82
 The Commission and the ECJ made their view regarding the applicability of 
Article 6 ECHR clear in several cases. They considered Article 6 ECHR not to be applicable 
to the Commission’s decision, due to the fact that the Commission was an administrative 
authority and did not constitute a tribunal under Article 6 ECHR.
83
 In light of the drafting of 
the CFREU the ECJ gradually departed from its aforementioned view. In Shell, the GC 
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stipulated that the Commission has to follow the general principles of EU law, which include 
the ECHR, during the administrative procedure.
84
 Furthermore, in Hüls the Court 
acknowledged that Article 6(2) ECHR, the presumption of innocence, is protected under the 
EU legal order and, moreover, even applies to competition law proceedings.
85
 The ECJ 
specified that Article 6(2) was found to be applicable to competition law proceedings, due to 
the nature of the infringements of competition law and the nature and severity of the fines.
86
 It 
can be noted that in Hüls the ECJ applied the Engel-criteria in considering the nature of the 
infringement and the degree of severity of the punishment. Thus, the ECJ followed the line of 
legal reasoning that the ECtHR established in the aforementioned judgments. However, 
following the Jussila judgment the ECJ has yet to determine whether it considers Article 6 
ECHR to apply with full stringency or reduced stringency, depending on whether competition 
law is considered to be hard core or peripheral criminal law. In the recent case of Schindler 
the GC confirmed the applicability of Article 6 ECHR, however it did not consider 
competition law to fall within the hard core of criminal law.
87
 Following the ECtHR’s 
Menarini judgment, the ECJ in KME
88
 and Chalkor
89
 the ECJ held that the courts of the EU, 
when conducting a judicial review, have to conduct an in-depth review of the law and the 
facts. The ECJ went on to state that the margin of discretion, the courts afford the 
Commission, cannot constitute a reason to dispense of this in-depth review of law and facts.
90
 
However, the ECJ clarified that the courts’ unlimited jurisdiction shall not compel them to 
conduct judicial review on their own motion.
91
 With regards to the judgments in KME and 
Chalkor, it is noteworthy that the ECJ refrained from referring to the full jurisdiction 
requirement under Article 6 ECHR and the related case law of the ECtHR, but rather referred 
to Article 47 CFREU. Nonetheless, it appears as if the ECJ, in the aftermath of the ECtHR’s 
Menarini ruling, realized that it had to change the approach the GC and ECJ had taken 
towards competition law cases over the years, in order for the proceedings to remain 
compatible with Article 6 ECHR. 
After initial denial, the Commission and the courts of the EU have acknowledged that Article 
6 ECHR does apply to competition law proceedings in EU law. Based on Article 52(3) 
CFREU Articles 47, 48 and 49 have to be read in the light of Article 6 ECHR and the related 
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case law of the ECtHR. Subsequently, the ECJ and the GC have, as can be seen in Hüls, 
accepted and applied the Engel-criteria, rendering competition law to fall within the scope of 
Article 6 ECHR. Moreover, the ECJ in KME and Chalkor reacted to the ECtHR’s Menarini 
judgment and stipulated that the Commission’s margin of discretion must not diminish the 
extent of judicial review, conducted by the GC and the ECJ. However, it is not yet clear 
whether Article 6 ECHR applies to competition law with full stringency, as the ECtHR has 
not addressed that issue yet. As mentioned above, the GC in Schindler indicated that Article 6 
could not be applied with full stringency to competition law.  While the Schindler judgments 
indicates that the GC considers competition law not to fall within the hard core of criminal 
law, the final determination whether or not Article 6 applies with full stringency to 
competition law will most likely have to be made by the ECtHR, rather than any EU court. 
Considering the fact that the ECtHR had the opportunity in Menarini, but decided not to 
declare competition law to fall outside the hard core of criminal law can be understood to 
indicate that the ECtHR does not consider competition law to be strictly outside the hard core 
of criminal law, given the severity of competition law fines and their punitive and deterrent 
nature. This decision in Menarini is very much in contrast to the ECtHR’s decision regarding 
tax law surcharges in Jussila for example, which the court declared to be outside the scope of 
hard core criminal law. Thus, if the ECtHR considered competition law not to belong to the 
hard core of criminal law in the same way as tax law, it could have done so in Menarini, but 
did not. Consequently, there is little legal precedent by the ECtHR to suggest that competition 
law is considered to fall strictly outside the hard core of criminal law, whereas there is some 
indication that the ECtHR might consider it to fall within the scope of hard core criminal law 
and therefore, competition law would be subject to the stringent application of Article 6 
ECHR. 
After all, the ECJ’s judgment in KME can be understood to be the ECJ’s attempt to change 
the approach taken towards competition law cases. Some argued that the ECJ would gradually 
increase the degree of judicial reviews and narrow the Commission’s discretion.92 It can be 
interpreted to constitute the beginning of a more coherent and more extensive approach in 
regards to judicial review in competition cases, which would have to be applied by the courts 
of the EU and the GC in particular. However, these changes, expected following the KME 
ruling, are just theoretical until they are consistently implemented in practice. In order to 
examine whether KME did lead to a more comprehensive approach regarding judicial review 
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in subsequent cases, this essay will in the following, focus on the case of Alliance One 
International v Commission, which was decided in 2013. 
2.3 C-679/11 Alliance One v European Commission 
The analysis of the presumption of parental liability will be revolving around the AOI case, 
which was decided in September 2013. For the purpose of the analysis, the different stages 
and relevant aspects of the AOI case will be presented in the following. First of all, the factual 
background of the competition law infringement in question will be introduced. Secondly, the 
relevant corporate groups, namely the subsidiaries and parent companies that were implicated 
in the infringement, will be introduced. The focus of this section is to identify and present the 
shareholdings of parent companies over their subsidiaries, which are relevant with regards to 
the presumption of parental liability. Thereafter, the Commission’s decision as well as AOI’s 
appeal to the GC will be presented. It has to be noted that for the purpose of this issue the 
fines imposed by the Commission will not be at issue, rather the reasoning of the Commission 
and the GC will be under observation. Lastly, the focus will be put on the appeal to the ECJ 
and the legal questions arising from it. 
2.3.1 Factual background of Commission Decision C(2004) 4030 
Having conducted investigations and inspections, which lead to a statement of objections 
being issued, the Commission found Agroexpansión SA, Compañía española de tabaco en 
rama SA [Cetarsa], Tabacos Españoles SL [Taes] and World Wide Tobacco España SA 
[WWTE], which are Spanish processors of raw tobacco in Spain, and Deltafina SpA 
[Deltafina], an Italian company which was the principal purchaser of raw tobacco in the 
Spanish market, to be involved in a buyers’ cartel.93 Thus, Commission Decision C(2004) 
4030
94
 is based on the Commission’s finding that a horizontal buyers cartel in the Spanish raw 
tobacco market had been set up and implemented. According to the results of the 
Commission’s investigation, this buyers’ cartel fixed delivery prices and shares of quantities 
of raw tobacco annually, between 1996 and 2001, and established price brackets for each 
variety of raw tobacco and minimum prices, between 1999 and 2001.
95
 This conduct of fixing 
purchasing prices, fixing certain trading conditions and sharing the market of raw tobacco 
falls under the hardcore restrictions in EU competition law and constitutes a breach of Article 
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101(1) TFEU.
96
 Thus, the Commission did exercise its power to impose fines on the 
companies involved in the cartel for the infringement of Article 101 TFEU, in accordance 
with Article 23 of Regulation 1/2003. 
2.3.2 Relevant corporate groups 
All shares of Agroexpansión, which had been established in 1988 as a family enterprise, were 
purchased by Intabex Netherlands BV [Intabex] in November 1997.
97
 Thus, Agroexpansión 
was wholly owned by Intabex. Since April 1997 Intabex itself had been wholly owned by 
Dimon Inc. [Dimon], rendering Agroexpansión to be wholly owned by Dimon through 
Intabex.
98
 Agroexpansión became part of the corporate group led by Dimon in 1997 about a 
year after the cartel among Spanish raw tobacco processors had been implemented. 
Subsequently, Agroexpansión was not owned, neither wholly nor partially, by either Dimon or 
Intabex in 1996, when the cartel was set up and implemented according to the aforementioned 
Commission’s decision.  The merger of Dimon with the American Standard Commercial 
Corp. [SCC] resulted in the formation of AOI, in May 2005.
99
 Thus, AOI, formerly Dimon, is 
Agroexpansión’s ultimate parent company, while Intabex is an intermediary parent of the 
latter. 
Around 90% of WWTE’s shares were held by Standard Commercial Tobacco Co. Inc. 
[SCTC] and Trans-Continental Leaf Tobacco Corporation [TCLT], since May 1998. Before 
May 1998, since 1995, two-thirds of WWTE’s shares were held by TCLT.100 Both, TCLT and 
SCTC are wholly owned by SCC.
 101
 Thus, SCC owned 90% of WWTE’s shares through its 
wholly owned subsidiaries TCLT and SCTC as intermediaries, rendering SCC to be WWTE’s 
ultimate parent company. However, SCC owned only two-thirds of WWTE’s shares in 1996, 
when the infringement of Article 101 TFEU commenced. Moreover, even after 1998 WWTE 
was not a wholly owned subsidiary of either SCC or one of the intermediaries. As mentioned 
above, SCC is the same company that merged with Dimon to become AOI, in 2005. This 
aforementioned merger renders AOI to be not only ultimate parent company Agroexpansión 
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but also WWTE’s, from May 2005 onwards. Intabex, TCLT and SCTC remained in their roles 
as intermediaries. 
Taes and Deltafina, were both subsidiaries of Universal Leaf Tobacco Co. Inc. [Universal 
Leaf]. While Universal Leaf wholly owned Deltafina, it owned only 90% of Taes’ shares 
prior to 2002, since December 2002 Taes is wholly owned by Universal Leaf as well.
102
 All 
shares of Universal Leaf were entirely owned by Universal Corp. [Universal], making it 
Taes’ and Deltafina’s ultimate parent company, while Universal Leaf was an intermediary.103 
Universal, consequently owned Taes and Deltafina both, largely or wholly, at the time the 
cartel was established and implemented in 1996. 
Cetarsa is a public undertaking which, prior to 1990, was the only company allowed to 
process raw tobacco in Spain.
104
 Based on the fact that it held a legal monopoly on processing 
raw tobacco, Cetarsa bought and processed the largest amount of raw tobacco among all 
processors. However, due to the fact that it is a public undertaking it is of minor relevance for 
the purpose of this essay. 
2.3.3 The Commission’s Decision 
On October 2004, in Decision C(2004) 4030, the Commission imposed fines on Cetarsa, 
Deltafina, Taes, Agroexpansión and WWTE for the aforementioned infringement of Article 
101 TFEU. The latter two were held jointly and severally liable with their respective parent 
companies, whereas Deltafina’s and Taes’ were not held jointly and severally liable.105 
Therefore, Dimon was considered liable with regards to Agroexpansión’s conduct and SCC, 
TCLT and SCTC with regards to the conduct of WWTE.
106
  
The Commission decided, after hearing the parties, not to hold Deltafina’s and Taes’ parents, 
Universal Leaf and Universal, and Agroexpansión’s intermediate parent, Intabex, jointly and 
severally liable.
107
 The Commission argued that it could not find Universal Leaf or Universal 
to be “materially involved” in their subsidiaries conduct in breach of Article 101 TFEU.108 
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Moreover, Intabex was exempted from liability due to the fact that the Commission 
considered its shareholding in Agroexpansión to be of a “purely financial” nature.109 The 
Commission later clarified that, even though it had referred to a “material involvement” 
criterion in exempting Universal from liability, it had actually applied the “dual burden test” 
to these parent companies and their subsidiaries, taking into account the respective 
shareholdings as well as further evidence.
110
 Due to the fact that the Commission did not find 
further evidence indicating Universal’s or Universal Leaf’s material involvement in their 
subsidiaries infringement of Article 101, the Commission thus found them not to be jointly 
and severally liable for those infringements. However, it is noteworthy that the Commission 
found Universal and Universal Leaf to be jointly and severally liable for Deltafina’s 
participation in an Italian raw tobacco cartel.
111
 
With regards to Dimon and Agroexpansión the Commission, however, relied on the 
aforementioned case law of the CJEU and applied the presumption of parental liability to 
hold Dimon jointly and severally liable.
112
 Moreover, the Commission considered other 
factors, such as “activity reports” informing Dimon of Agroexpansión’s conduct, to confirm 
this presumption.
113
 Therefore, one could argue that the Commission applied the “dual burden 
test”. However, the Commission stated that its decision to hold Dimon jointly and severally 
liable was based on the presumption that Dimon, due to the fact that it wholly owned 
Agroexpansión, exercised decisive influence over its subsidiary.
114
 Even in later proceedings 
in front of the GC the Commission explained that it held Dimon liable solely based on the 
presumption.
115
 Thus, the evidentiary quality of the aforementioned activity reports was 
irrelevant with regards to Dimon being jointly and severally liable. Nonetheless, the GC found 
that the Commission, according to the court’s interpretation of Decision C(2004) 4030, had 
applied the “dual burden test” to all parent companies, including Dimon.116 This gave raise to 
Dimon’s claim that the GC established the “dual burden test” as the relevant standard of proof 
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ex post facto to which all companies had been subjected, as will be elaborated on in the 
following sections. 
2.3.4 The appeal to the General Court 
In January 2005 Dimon, now AOI, brought action for annulment of the Commission’s 
decision. Dimon argued that first of all that Article 101(1) TFEU and Article 23 Regulation 
1/2003 as well as the principle of proportionality were infringed by holding Dimon liable for 
Agroexpansión’s unlawful conduct, participating in a buyers’ cartel.117 Secondly, Dimon 
argued the Commission had violated the principle of proportionality by not showing that 
Dimon directly participated in Agroexpansión’s infringement of Article 101(1) TFEU.118 
Thirdly, the principle of proportionality and personal liability, as well as Article 23(2) 
Regulation 1/2003 were breached in holding Dimon jointly and severally liable for 
Agroexpansión’s conduct prior to being wholly owned by Dimon in  November of 1997.119 
Fourthly, the principle of legitimate expectations was breached by not considering mitigating 
circumstances in calculating the amount of the fine.
120
 Lastly, Dimon argued that the 
Commission failed to fulfill its obligation to state reasons for its decision.
121
 
The GC dismissed all grounds of appeal raised by Dimon except for the third, namely the GC 
upheld that Dimon should not be held liable for Agroexpansión’s infringements of Article 
101(1) before becoming part of the Dimon group.
122
 As mentioned above, the Commission 
found in its decision that the Buyers’ cartel in the Spanish raw tobacco market, in which 
Agroexpansión participated, had fixed purchasing prices from 1996 onwards. Thus, 
Agroexpansión was involved in unlawful conduct in violation of Article 101(1) TFEU for, as 
far as the Commission can prove it, at least over a year before becoming a subsidiary of 
Dimon, through Intabex. This ruling by the GC, however, did not result in the annulment of 
the entire decision Dimon had been striving for, but resulted instead in the ruling that Dimon 
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simply could not be held jointly and severally liable for the infringements prior to November 
1997.
123
 
Moreover, the GC, as mentioned above, came to the conclusion, which was based on its own 
interpretation of the decision, that the Commission had applied the “dual burden test” to all 
parent companies, despite the fact that the Commission had in a written explanation to the 
court stated the contrary.
124
 The Commission had, in the aforementioned written explanation, 
confirmed that Dimon was held liable solely based on the presumption of parental liability, 
whereas the liability of other parent companies had been established through the “dual burden 
test”.125 
2.3.5 The appeal to the ECJ 
Following the unsuccessful appeal to the GC, AOI brought an appeal to the ECJ against the 
GC’s ruling in T-41/05, which was fully rejected by the ECJ.126 The Commission lodged a 
cross-appeal mainly directed against paragraph 214 of the GC’s decision, reducing the fines 
imposed on Agroexpansión and its parent company.
127
 However, the focus of this essay will 
be on AOI’s appeal. 
 AOI appealed to the ECJ, seeking the GC’s ruling to be set aside and the Decision of the 
Commission to be annulled. AOI based its appeal on four grounds, which can be summarized 
as follows: First of all, AOI claimed that the GC misapplied Article 101(1) TFEU and 23(2) of 
Regulation 1/2003. The GC breached AOI’s rights of defense and Article 296 TFEU, the 
obligation to state reasons for decisions, by clarifying ex post facto in the judgment that the 
Commission had applied the “dual basis test”. Furthermore, AOI considered the application of 
the “dual-burden test” to be arbitrary, due to the fact that evidence is not required in general to 
attribute liability. As a result thereof, the presumption of parental liability might be applied 
strictly in some cases, whereas the “dual burden test” is applied in other cases.128 Moreover, 
AOI argued that according to the Commission’s explanation Dimon was held liable solely 
based on the presumption, while other parent companies, like Universal Leaf and Universal, 
                                                 
123
 Alliance One International Inc. v European Commission (C-679/11) [2013], E.C.R I-000 (not yet reported), 
para. 23. 
124
 Alliance One International Inc. v European Commission (T-41/05) [2011], E.C.R II-7101, paras. 117-119. 
125
 Alliance One International Inc. v European Commission (C-679/11) [2013], E.C.R I-000 (not yet reported), 
para. 29. 
126
 Alliance One International Inc. v European Commission (C-679/11) [2013], E.C.R I-000 (not yet reported), 
para. 116. 
127
 Alliance One International Inc. v European Commission (C-679/11) [2013], E.C.R I-000 (not yet reported), 
para. 90. 
128
 Alliance One International Inc. v European Commission (C-679/11) [2013], E.C.R I-000 (not yet reported), 
para. 30. 
26 
 
were held to a different standard, as their liability was established through the “dual burden 
test”.129 AOI argued that the evidence concerning Universal’s exercise of decisive influence 
was as solid or not solid as the evidence concerning Dimon’s involvement, thus had the “dual 
burden test” been applied both parent companies should have faced the same outcome.130 
Secondly, AOI argued that a presumption of guilt is in principle forbidden. Therefore the 
GC’s decision violates its fundamental rights under Article 48 and 49 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union, namely the right to the presumption of innocence 
and the principles of legality and individual liability for criminal offences and penalties. 
Thirdly, AOI argues that the GC upheld the discriminatory way in which the fines were 
calculated. Lastly, AOI claims that the GC erred in not applying Section B, Point 3 of the 
1998 Guidelines on fines.
131
 
For the purpose of the discussion of the presumption of parental liability, this essay will be 
focused on the first and second ground of appeal brought by AOI.  
The ECJ rejected the first ground of appeal, namely that the GC breached AOI’s right to 
defense by not finding the Commissions’ statement of reasons insufficient and clarifying ex 
post facto the “dual-burden test” to be the standard of proof the Commission had applied in its 
decision.
132
 In its decision the Commission itself had not indicated the application of the “dual 
burden test” in its decision, but referred to the absence of “material involvement” as a 
criterion for exempting companies, such as Universal and Universal Leaf, from being held 
jointly and severally liable for the infringements of their subsidiaries.
133
 Moreover, AOI 
claimed that the “dual burden test” was applied arbitrarily, as mentioned above.134 The ECJ 
dismissed this plea based on the fact that it considered the GC’s decision to be correct in 
rejecting a “material involvement test” reading of recital 376 of the decision, due to the fact 
that “material involvement” was not the standard, according to the Courts case law, by which 
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parental liability was established.
135
 Moreover, the GC, according to the ECJ, did not err in 
recognizing the Commission’s application of the “dual burden test”, instead of the “material 
involvement” method, which AOI claimed had been applied.136 The GC, in the eyes of the 
ECJ, had correctly based its assessment of the applied “dual basis” method on its own 
interpretation thereof, thus rendering AOI’s argument, that the GC had ex post facto defined 
the application of the “dual-basis” method in this case, unfounded.137 Furthermore, the ECJ 
stated that the GC had correctly held that the dual “basis method” had not applied it arbitrarily 
as claimed by AOI, but that it had in fact been applied to all of the parent companies 
concerned by the Commission’s Decision equally.138 In doing so the ECJ reaffirmed the GC’s 
ruling, despite the fact that the Commission had, in a written response to the GC, admitted to 
holding Dimon liable based solely on the presumption of parental liability, while applying the 
“dual basis” method to some other parent companies.139 More explicitly the ECJ stated that 
the GC’s finding regarding this argument, concerning the application of different standards of 
proof, could not have been invalidated by the aforementioned response of the Commission, 
even though the Commission had confirmed that Dimon had been held to a different 
standard.
140
 The ECJ invalidated the core of AOI’s argumentation by stating that the 
Commission’s written explanation to the GC could not invalidate the GC’s own interpretation 
of the Commission’s decision. Subsequently, the arbitrary application of different standards of 
proof, namely the presumption of parental liability and the “dual burden test”, was considered 
to be inexistent, despite the fact that the Commission had acknowledged it. 
The second ground of appeal, namely that AOI’s fundamental rights including the 
presumption of innocence had been infringed, was declared inadmissible.
141
 The ECJ based 
this decision on the fact that AOI had not raised these arguments in the appeal to the GC.
142
 
Administrative rules limit the ECJ’s jurisdiction to review only the pleas that had already 
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been raised at the GC.
143
  Despite being rejected by the ECJ in AOI, fundamental rights, as 
grounds of appeal, are an interesting issue with regards to the rebuttability of the presumption 
of parental liability, especially considering the increasing number of parent companies 
invoking fundamental rights in their attempt to rebut the presumption. 
3. Analysis 
In the following, the legal and factual circumstances, which were explained above, will be 
analyzed. The Analysis will be focused on parent companies’ chances to rebut the 
presumption of parental liability, as well as the aforementioned requirement of full judicial 
review in the light of the recent Menarini and KME judgments. First the legal questions 
regarding the presumption, around which the analysis with revolve, will be introduced. 
Thereafter, the general rebuttability of the presumption of parental liability will be examined 
under consideration of exemplary case law. The rebuttable nature of the presumption will be 
examined under consideration of several factors. First the extent of the notion of “exercise of 
decisive influence” will be analyzed. Secondly, the decreased standards regarding the notion 
of “lack of autonomy” will be analyzed. Thereafter, the focus of the analysis will turn to the 
increased importance of corporate links. Lastly, the effectiveness of fundamental rights 
arguments will be analyzed. After analyzing these different factors, it will be argued that the 
presumption of parental liability is in practice not rebuttable. The analysis part of this essay 
will be concluded with the analysis of the AOI ruling, in the light of the requirement of full 
judicial review.  
3.1 Legal questions 
The main legal question regarding the presumption has in general always been how 
companies can rebut the presumption. It has been argued that parent companies are very much 
in the dark as to what evidence they would have to produce to rebut the presumption. Thus, , 
the question, more specifically, has to be what kind of evidence parent companies would have 
to present, in order be accepted by the Commission and to successfully rebut the presumption.  
The AOI case raises further questions as to the consistency of the Commission’s application 
of legal standards, in this case the presumption of parental liability and the “dual burden test”. 
The fact that the Commission, as mentioned above, acknowledged that it had applied the 
presumption to Dimon, while applying different criteria to the remaining parent companies, 
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emphasizes that the alleged arbitrary application of either standard is not merely a fabrication 
of the applicant. Moreover, this also raises questions concerning the Commission’s duty to 
state reasons under Article 296 TFEU. The application of different standards to different 
parent companies would, at the very least, have to be justified pursuant to the obligation to 
state reasons for the decision. Furthermore, the Commission’s referral to the absence of 
“material involvement” as the main reason as to why Universal and Universal Leaf were 
exempted from liability inevitably led to legal uncertainty. This could in reverse be construed 
to mean, that material involvement would have to be proven by the Commission to hold 
companies liable under the “dual burden test”. Subsequently, the Commissions statement of 
reasons in Decision C(2004) 4030 led to considerable uncertainty, as to which standard had 
been applied and how it had been applied, which became apparent throughout the appeals to 
the GC and the ECJ. Therefore, the Commission’s decision raised considerable questions 
regarding the Commission’s standards of reasoning, and more importantly regarding its 
standards in holding parent companies liable for infringements of the subsidiaries. 
AOI’s failed appeal to the GC raises questions regarding the judicial review conducted by the 
GC and the margin of appreciation afforded to the Commission by the GC. The GC 
disregarded the lack of substantial reasoning in dismissing AOI’s fifth ground of appeal, 
despite the fact that the Commission had admitted that its decision should have been phrased 
more clearly.
144
 Furthermore, the GC superseded the Commission’s written explanation, 
stating that different standard had been applied with regards to Dimon as compared to other 
companies, with its own interpretation of the decision.
145
 As mentioned before, this led to 
AOI’s claim that the GC had ex post facto established the legal standard of the Commission’s 
decision, which according to Article 296 TFEU should have been established in the decision 
itself. Moreover, questions regarding the GC’s judicial review can also be raised in light of 
the fact that the Commission exempted Universal and Universal Leaf from liability in the 
Spanish cartel case, but in another geographical market found them liable, based on the 
identical parent-subsidiary relationship as in the Spanish cartel.
146
 Thus, one has to question 
the stringency and comprehensiveness of the GC’s judicial review, in law and in fact, of 
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Commission decisions. Moreover, it has to be questioned whether the judicial review 
conducted by the GC, even after KME, fulfills the criteria of full judicial review under Article 
6 ECHR and subsequently Article 47 CFREU. 
In light of these questions regarding the comprehensiveness and stringency of the judicial 
review of Commission decisions, questions can also be raised with regards to the 
effectiveness of the remedy of appeal to the GC. AOI’s appeals to the GC and ECJ illustrate 
the validity of these questions concerning the effectiveness of appeals against Commission 
decisions, and the judicial review afforded to parent companies in those appeals. 
In general the case emphasizes the existing questions as to whether and how parent companies 
can effectively rebut the presumption, as even the apparently successful rebuttal of the 
liability of Universal and Intabex was not elaborated on in the Commission’s decision. 
Despite the fact that Universal, Universal Leaf and Intabex were found not to be jointly and 
severally liable with their respective subsidiaries, the Commission did not provide parent 
companies with an indication as to what evidence would have to be produced, in order to 
rebut the presumption.
147
 
3.2 Rebuttability of the presumption of parental liability 
The GC and ECJ have, in their respective case law, time and again reiterated the rebuttable 
nature of the presumption of parental liability.
148
 However, this rebuttable nature has to be 
enforceable in practice for it to be of any legal value for parent companies, being held liable 
with their subsidiaries.  Thus, in the following the rebuttable nature of the presumption will be 
examined under consideration of case law. For that purpose not only the AOI case but other 
cases in which parent companies tried to rebut the presumption will be discussed. 
Considering the case law of both courts of the EU, one could argue that parent companies first 
and foremost have to prove that they do not exercise decisive influence over their subsidiaries 
conduct, in order to rebut the presumption of parental liability. The criterion of exercise of 
decisive influence, which even includes negative control over a subsidiary, has been 
established in case law and has since been codified in the Guidelines on the applicability of 
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Article 101.
149
 Parent companies would most likely also have to prove that their subsidiaries 
do not lack the autonomy to determine their market conduct autonomously.
150
 In this context 
it is noteworthy to remember that in applying the presumption of parental liability the 
Commission can presume the exercise of decisive influence based on 100% shareholding. 
Thus, the Commission does not have to prove that decisive influence was in fact exercised by 
the parent company. Moreover, parent companies have to disprove a presumption, which has 
not been proven by the Commission, rather than disproving factual evidence. Subsequently, it 
has been argued by some that the presumption of parental liability effectively renders the 
Commission’s task to prove exercise of decisive control a walkover, based on the fact that 
exercise of influence can be presumed rather than having to be proven.
151
 Nonetheless, 
according to the case law of both, ECJ and GC, parent companies should, in theory, be able to 
rebut the presumption and avoid parental liability by adducing “sufficient evidence”, proving 
the autonomy of the subsidiary as well as disproving the exercise of decisive influence.
152
 
In practice, however, parent companies face considerable problems proving their subsidiaries 
autonomy, and disproving the exercise of decisive influence. Not only did the ECJ in Akzo 
and subsequent judgments not define what would qualify as “sufficient evidence”, but the 
courts gradually broadened the notion of “exercise of decisive influence”.153 
3.2.1 The notion of “exercise decisive influence”  
In Gascogne, the GC interpreted the requirement of exercise of decisive influence in a very 
liberal way and subsequently broadened the notion of “exercise of decisive influence”.  The 
court, on several occasions throughout the judgment, referred to the fact that Gascogne could 
intervene or had the possibility to intervene.
154
 Moreover, the court interpreted Gascogne’s 
decision not to change its subsidiaries management personnel to constitute an exercise of 
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decisive influence.
155
 Actual changes concerning the management personnel would have 
certainly constituted an exercise of decisive influence, whereas the court considered the 
decision not to implement changes to constitute an exercise of decisive influence in itself. The 
court, in equating the indicative value of actions and non-actions of a parent company, relaxed 
the standards with regards to the actual “exercise” of decisive influence. Subsequently, this 
can be construed to indicate that not the actual exercise of decisive influence, but rather the 
possibility or ability to exercise decisive influence are sufficient to establish parental liability 
in the eyes of the GC. Thus, the ability to exercise of decisive influence appears to be the 
criterion by which parental liability is actually being established, despite the fact that the case 
law of the courts consistently referred to the exercise of decisive influence. As mentioned 
above the court had, in cases like Bodson
156
 and Viho
157
, established that exercise of decisive 
influence was considered to be the determining factor of whether a parent company and its 
subsidiary formed a single economic unit or “undertaking” under Article 101 TFEU. 
Moreover, the Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 refer only to the actual exercise 
rather than the ability to exercise decisive influence.
158
 Furthermore, in the case of Parker 
Hannifin the GC extended the notion of “exercise” of decisive influence to include the 
attempt to exercise influence.
159
 Parker Hannifin claimed that it was unaware of the conduct 
of its subsidiary and that it unsuccessfully attempted to exercise influence over the latter.
160
 
The court did not consider the evidence produced by Parker Hannifin to be sufficient to 
establish that Parker Hannifin was legitimately prevented from exercising decisive influence 
over the subsidiary.
161
 The court based that assessment on the fact that Parker Hannifin could 
have replaced the personnel, which prevented the exercise of decisive influence.
162
 Thus, the 
court reaffirmed that the possibility or ability to exchange personnel can be considered to fall 
within the exercise of decisive influence. The GC’s interpretations concerning Gascogne’s 
and Parker Hannifin’s conduct has to be received with some skepticism, due to the fact that 
the decision not to exercise influence over its subsidiary, when applied consistently, should 
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exonerate the parent company in question. Nonetheless, in extending the notion of “exercise” 
of decisive influence to include the ability and the attempt to exercise, the GC has 
considerably broadened the standard used to determine whether two companies form a single 
economic unit. Especially considering wholly owned subsidiaries it seems unlikely that parent 
companies could adduce “sufficient evidence” to prove that they did not have the possibility 
or ability to exercise decisive influence. Therefore, parent companies will inevitably find it 
more difficult to prove that they do not have the ability or possibility to exercise influence, as 
compared to proving that they do not exercise influence.  
Thus, AOI would have had to prove that it neither exercised nor had the possibility to exercise 
decisive influence over its subsidiary Agroexpansión, in order to rebut the presumption. 
Universal is considered to be the only parent company to successfully rebut the Commission’s 
presumption, despite the fact that the Commission did not elaborate on how Universal did 
prove that it did not exercise decisive influence or, as the Commission put it, was not 
materially involved in the infringement.
163
 However, this has to be understood in the light of 
the fact that the Commission did hold Universal liable for Deltafina’s infringement in the 
Italian raw tobacco cartel.
164
 It is difficult to imagine that the Commission applied this broad 
notion of exercise of decisive influence to Universal, and found no indication that Universal 
had the possibility to exercise influence or to be materially involved in its wholly owned 
subsidiaries conduct. 
3.2.2 Decreased standards regarding the notion of “lack of autonomy” 
In ENI the ECJ ruled, that the degree of autonomy ENI’s subsidiary enjoyed was not 
sufficient to consider them not to constitute a single economic unit, due to the fact that the 
subsidiary was not autonomous on a financial level.
165
 One has to wonder, especially 
considering the presumption of parental liability, whether any wholly owned subsidiary can 
be considered to be financially autonomous from its parent company. Moreover, in the 
aforementioned Gascogne case the GC acknowledged that the subsidiary had a “grande” 
autonomy regarding its market conduct.
166
 Gascogne’s subsidiary determined its costs, prices, 
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margins, targets, and technical improvements autonomously.
167
 Nonetheless, the GC 
considered Gascogne to exercise or to have the ability to exercise decisive influence over its 
subsidiary, despite the great autonomy the subsidiary enjoyed.
168
 Thus, the GC rejected 
Gascogne’s appeal which was based on the autonomy of its subsidiary. 
In Viho
169
 and Bodson
170
 the ECJ had established that the subsidiary has to lack the autonomy 
to determine its market conduct to render parent company and subsidiary to constitute a single 
economic unit. The extent of such autonomy remained unspecified in the case law of the 
courts. The case law did however, specifically refer to the autonomy to determine ones market 
conduct, which arguably was given especially in Gascogne considering the “grande” 
autonomy it enjoyed.
171
 Considering the ENI case, it has to be noted that the requirement of 
financial autonomy of a subsidiary was not stated in the courts case law. Moreover, it appears 
unrealistic that a parent company could prove the financial autonomy of its wholly owned 
subsidiary. ENI and Gascogne illustrate that even “grande” autonomy does in the eyes of the 
court not suffice to fulfill the requirements. It has to be questioned how a subsidiary, which in 
the eyes of the GC has “grande” autonomy can be following its parents instructions in all 
material aspects, despite its autonomy.
172
 Thus, one can argue that the extent of the notion of 
“autonomy” of a subsidiary, which a parent company would have to prove to avoid liability, 
has been broadened considerably. The courts have gradually abandoned the concept of 
autonomy regarding market conduct, and applied a far more extensive concept of autonomy, 
which is not tied to market conduct anymore. Similar to the example concerning the exercise 
of decisive influence above, these cases indicate how broadly the courts interpret the criteria 
as to whether parents and subsidiaries constitute a single economic unit. Therefore, from the 
perspective of a parent company, proving that one’s subsidiary determines its market conduct 
autonomously is not sufficient in order to avoid being held liable as one “undertaking”. 
3.2.3 Increased relevance of links between companies 
Traditionally parental liability was established based on the exercise of decisive influence and 
the subsidiaries subsequent lack of autonomy to determine its own market conduct, as 
explained in the section on the single economic unit doctrine. In recent cases however, the GC 
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in particular focused more on legal, economic and organizational links between parent 
companies and subsidiaries. In Akzo the ECJ held that parent companies can be held liable for 
their subsidiaries conduct, if the subsidiary lacks autonomy due to organizational, economic 
or legal links to the parent company.
173
 Thus, the aforementioned links between companies 
render the exercise of decisive influence on the subsidiaries market conduct to be no longer 
necessary to determine whether a parent company and subsidiary form a single economic unit. 
The GC followed the ECJ’s precedent set in Akzo on several occasions. In E.ON Ruhrgas the 
GC reaffirmed that, in order to determine whether two companies constitute a single 
economic unit, all relevant legal, economic and organizational links have to be taken into 
account.
174
 Moreover, in FLS Plast the court stated that the subsidiary’s autonomy 
determining its market conduct is irrelevant, if there are other factors, such as economic, 
organizational and legal links between the subsidiary and the parent company, to determine 
that the two companies constitute a single economic unit.
175
 Some have argued that the 
possibility to establish the existence of a single economic unit based on links between parent 
companies and subsidiaries further erodes the “exercise of decisive influence” requirement.176 
Even though the concept of exercise of decisive influence has been extended considerably, as 
mentioned above, it can be rendered irrelevant, if there are sufficient links between parent 
company and subsidiary. Thus, despite the fact that the broadened concept regarding the 
exercise of influence is very difficult to rebut, the Commission does not need the concept of 
decisive influence to find companies to constitute a single economic unit, as long as there are 
sufficient links between the parent and subsidiary.
177
 Therefore, parent companies face a 
considerable hurdle in attempting to rebut the presumption of parental liability, as any wholly 
owned subsidiary inevitably has economic, legal and organizational links to its parent 
company. 
Thus one can conclude from the sections above, that disproving decisive influence and the 
lack of autonomy, which had been established as criteria for a single economic unit, is 
increasingly difficult. This is due to the fact that, as can be seen from the examples above, the 
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courts gradually broadened the criteria, which companies would have to disprove to avoid 
liability, rendering them virtually unable to rebut the presumption of parental liability.
178
 
With the emerging importance of legal, economic and organizational links in mind, one can 
only wonder how the Commission came to two different decisions regarding the liability of 
Universal and Universal Leaf concerning the competition law infringements of its subsidiary 
Deltafina. As mentioned above, Universal was exempted from liability in the Spanish tobacco 
case, whereas it was held liable in the Italian case.
179
 The relationship between Universal and 
its subsidiaries was identical in the Spanish and the Italian case.
180
 Thus, the legal, economic 
and organizational links can be considered to have been identical, or at the very least nearly 
identical. Based on the aforementioned rulings in Akzo
181
, E.ON
182
 and FLS
183
 one can 
conclude that identical links between parent company and subsidiary in two separate cases 
should result in the same decision regarding the parent companies liability. Following the line 
of reasoning in the aforementioned cases, the links between Universal, Universal Leaf and the 
two subsidiaries Deltafina and Taes should have been sufficient to hold Universal liable 
jointly and severally. However, the Commission’s decisions in the Spanish and Italian 
tobacco cartel cases illustrate the contrary. Universal was held liable in the Italian case, 
whereas it was exempted from liability in the Spanish case, despite the fact that the corporate 
links between Universal and Deltafina were the same.  It has to be reiterated that the 
Commission exempted Universal from being jointly and severally liable with its subsidiary, 
due to the fact that it could not find any “material involvement” of Universal. One has to 
question how the Commission could come to two manifestly different decisions concerning 
the same set of links. How could the Commission find Universal not to be materially involved 
in Deltafina’s conduct in Spain, while finding it to be exercising decisive influence over 
Deltafina in Italy? This illustrates an arbitrariness regarding the standards applied by the 
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Commission in different cases, as AOI claimed in its appeal to the ECJ.
184
 Furthermore, it 
reaffirms the questions AOI raised regarding the Commission’s reasoning.185 The role of the 
GC which upheld the Commission decision, despite the flawed reasoning, can also be called 
into question. 
3.2.4 Fundamental rights arguments 
Parent companies began to raise fundamental rights arguments in their appeals, due to the fact 
that the courts considerably broadened the concepts of lack of autonomy and exercise of 
decisive influence and subsequently rejected countless attempts to rebut or appeal the 
presumption of parental liability. Aside of the cases discussed above, the courts have rejected 
a wide array of rebuttal attempts brought by parent companies.
186
 Moreover, neither the courts 
nor the Commission afforded any guidance to parent companies as to what evidence would be 
considered sufficient to rebut the presumption.
187
 Thus, many parent companies, including 
AOI, resorted to bringing appeals against the presumption based on their fundamental rights, 
due to the fact that the presumption is considered to be virtually impossible to rebut, as 
discussed in the above. 
In several cases, including AOI, the ECJ declared appeals based on Article 6 ECHR 
inadmissible, due to the fact that the parties had not raised the right to a fair trial in their 
appeal to the GC.
188
 It has been argued that such decisions made it impossible for parent 
companies, like Legris or AOI, to bring appeals based on the violation of their right to a fair 
trial.
189
 In the recent Eni case the ECJ declared the complaint regarding a violation of the fair 
trial principle admissible, under rather restricted circumstances.
190
 However, after finding that 
the plea based on Article 6 ECHR and Article 47 CFREU was admissible, the ECJ did not 
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discuss them anymore throughout the judgment. Subsequently, the ECJ reaffirmed the GC’s 
decision without focusing at great length on the fair trial issue in question.
191
 Thus, the ECJ 
did not examine whether or not the judicial review conducted by the GC was in conformity 
with Articles 6 ECHR and 47 CFREU. This indicates the ECJ’s tendency to uphold and 
endorse the GC’s decisions which in turn endorses and strengthens the Commission’s 
decisions, as was the case in AOI. Therefore, even if AOI appeal based on the fair trial 
argument had been admitted by the ECJ, it most likely would not have resulted in an 
annulment of the GC’s decision. 
Moreover, the argument that the presumption of parental liability is in violation of the 
principle of personal liability has frequently been rejected. As was explained in the section on 
the single economic unit doctrine the principle is considered to apply to the “undertaking” or 
corporate group, rather than the individual company in breach of competition law.
192
 Some 
argue that this approach effectively equals a denial of the right of personal responsibility, due 
to the fact that “undertakings” cannot rely on this right because they have no legal 
personality.
193
 
All in all, neither the principle of personal liability nor the right to a fair trial has yet been 
used successfully to avoid liability. Thus, neither appeals based on factual arguments nor 
appeals based on fundamental rights a viable option for parent companies to rebut the 
presumption and prevent being held jointly and severally liable. However, the referrals to 
Article 6 ECHR raise questions as to whether the competition law proceedings under EU law 
are compatible with the right to a fair trial. 
3.2.5 Is the presumption rebuttable in practice?  
While the courts reiterate the theoretical rebuttable nature of the presumption of parental 
liability in their case law, the presumption appears to be not rebuttable in practice. As 
mentioned above, the courts have time and again rejected various forms of evidence and legal 
arguments, produced by parent companies in order to rebut the presumption of parental 
liability.
194
 Moreover, neither the courts nor the Commission have provided any guidance 
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regarding what evidence would be deemed sufficient to rebut the presumption.
195
 The notions 
of “exercise of decisive influence” and “lack of autonomy” were extended considerably 
through the jurisprudence of the courts. As a result thereof, the requirement of exercise of 
decisive influence has been eroded. Thus, disproving the exercise of decisive influence and 
proving the autonomy of a subsidiary has been rendered impossible.
196
 
The case law of the GC, and in particular the AOI case, shows that the GC has developed a 
tendency to afford the Commission a margin of appreciation and to look past possible 
deficiencies in the Commission’s decisions.197 The GC can often be found to strengthen and 
support the Commission’s decisions, as can be observed in AOI. Moreover, The ECJ did also 
develop a tendency to uphold and endorse the GC’s decisions.  
However, in Air Liquide, the GC annulled a Commission decision based on the insufficient 
degree of legal reasoning provided by the Commission.
198
 Similarly, in Elf Aquitaine the ECJ 
broke with the tendency to reaffirm most GC decisions and declared that the GC had erred in 
not finding the Commission’s statement of reasons to be insufficient.199 However, this does 
not change the overall situation regarding the rather irrebuttable nature of the presumption, as 
in both cases no decision was made based on the merits of the respective cases, but solely 
based on the insufficient statement of reasons under Article 296 TFEU. The Commission will 
draw consequences from the Air Liquide judgment and will provide more sufficient legal 
reasoning in future decision. The GC will likewise adjust its judicial review slightly. 
However, neither case gives parent companies a perspective of successfully rebutting the 
presumption. 
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Nonetheless, the AOI case indicates that the GC still follows its tendency to uphold and 
strengthen Commission decision, even if there are obvious deficiencies with regards to the 
Commission’s statement of reasons. As mentioned above, the GC disregarded the 
Commission’s admission that its decision should have been phrased clearer and that AOI had 
been held to a different standard than the other companies.
200
 Moreover, the ECJ upheld and 
endorsed the GC’s judgment.   
In conclusion, the theory and practice regarding the rebuttable nature of the presumption do 
not match up. The presumption of parental liability was, as mentioned in the above, 
considered to render the notion of “exercise of decisive influence” a walkover criterion.201 
This criterion has to be considered to be even less tangible after the courts extended the 
notions of “exercise of decisive influence” and “lack of autonomy” to a point where parent 
companies cannot under normal circumstances disprove either of them. In addition, the 
courts’ tendencies to support the Commission’s decisions make it even harder for parent 
companies to successfully defend against the presumption of parental liability. Consequently, 
the presumption of parental liability is, contrary to what the ECJ and GC reiterate time and 
time again, not rebuttable. Moreover, one could argue that in fact the presumption of parental 
liability actually renders parent companies to be strictly liable for their subsidiaries conduct 
with regards to competition law. 
3.3 Full judicial review 
In the following it will be examined whether the Menarini ruling by the ECtHR and the 
subsequent KME ruling by the ECJ actually changed the approach and extent of judicial 
review. KME raised some hope that the GC’s approach toward judicial review of Commission 
decisions would become more comprehensive and stringent.
202
 Moreover, it will be examined 
if case like AOI would satisfy the requirements of Article 6 ECHR. 
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As mentioned above, full judicial review is a requirement under Article 6 ECHR.
203
 Thus, in 
order for European competition law proceedings, with the Commission acting as investigator, 
prosecutor and decision making authority, to be compatible with Article 6 ECHR the courts of 
appeal have to have full jurisdiction to review the law and facts of cases. The GC has 
unlimited jurisdiction, as explained above.
204
 However, the GC has been noticed to rarely use 
the full extent of its unlimited jurisdiction, especially with regards to conducting judicial 
review.
205
 With regards to competition law cases, the GC generally affords the Commission a 
margin of appreciation concerning complex appraisals. Pursuant to the “complex appraisals” 
formula the GC will limit its review of Commission decisions to controlling the compliance 
with procedural rules, the statement of reasons, the statement of facts, as well as whether there 
was any manifest error or misuse of power by the Commission.
206
 Due to the margin of 
appreciation afforded to the Commission such reviews are very limited in scope. However, it 
also has to be noted that cartel cases in itself are extraordinary difficult to prove for the 
Commission, thus the margin of appreciation is a way to ensure the effective enforcement of 
EU competition law. Nonetheless, this margin of appreciation has to be balanced against the 
judicial review of the courts. 
The limits of this approach regarding judicial review become apparent considering the case of 
AOI. The GC should have reviewed the Commissions statement of reasons. Throughout such 
a review the GC should have noted that the Commission apparently applied uncommon 
criteria, such as “material involvement”. The Commission had argued that Universal and 
Universal Leaf shall be exempted from liability for the conduct of their wholly owned 
subsidiary Deltafina, based on the fact that there was no indication of “material involvement” 
of either parent company.
207
 However, the GC did not find fault in the fact that the 
Commission referred to a criterion which had not been established through previous case law. 
Furthermore, the Commission also did not consider the fact that the legal standard, which had 
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been applied to establish the liability of the parent companies, was not clearly stated 
problematic. The court did not find any deficiencies, despite the fact that AOI in its appeal 
claimed that the statement of reasons in the Commission’s decision was insufficient. The GC 
did not find any problem with the statement of reasons, even after the written explanation of 
the Commission. As mentioned before, the Commission admitted that its statement of reasons 
should have been phrased in a clearer manner.
208
 Moreover, the Commission explained that it 
actually had held AOI liable solely on the basis of the presumption of parental liability, 
whereas it had applied the “dual burden test” to the other parent companies.209 Thus, despite 
the fact that the Commission openly acknowledged deficiencies in its statement of reasons, 
the GC did not consider the statement of reasons to be insufficient. Thus, the GC did not find 
fault with the admitted arbitrary application of the presumption of parental liability to AOI. 
Moreover, the GC superseded the Commission’s decision and explanation thereof, with its 
own interpretation of the decision.
210
 Subsequently, it can be argued that the GC followed its 
aforementioned tendency and upheld and strengthened a questionable Commission decision. 
Furthermore, AOI’s argument that the GC established the “dual burden test” as the standard 
applied in the Commission’s decision appears to have some merit, due to the fact that the 
Commission explained that it had in fact applied different standard. This has to be observed 
with considerable skepticism due to the fact that the GC disregarded substantial deficiencies 
with regards to the statement of reasons, which had been acknowledged by the Commission. 
Based on the fact that the Commission acknowledged the deficiencies of its statement of 
reasons, the GC should not have needed a full in depth review to find that the statement of 
reasons was not in accordance with Article 296 TFEU. However, the GC decided to uphold 
and strengthen the Commission’ decision, and thus holding the Commission to an extremely 
low standard regarding the duty to state reasons. 
Furthermore, the limitations regarding the GC’s review become apparent considering the 
liability of Universal. As mentioned above Universal and Universal Leaf were found to be not 
liable for Deltafina’s participartion in the Spanish raw tobacco cartel, whereas a year later the 
Commission held them liable for Deltafina’s participation in the Italian raw tobacco cartel.211 
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This illustrates an arbitrariness regarding the standards applied by the Commission in separate 
but almost identical cases, while the Commission’s explanation to the GC illustrates the 
arbitrariness regarding the application standards applied to separate companies within one 
case. Moreover, it shows that the facts relied on were not applied consistently. In the 
aforementioned EFTA Court judgment in Posten Norge the court had pointed out, that the 
court reviewing a decision should be convinced that the decision is supported by facts.
212
 It 
seems unlikely that the GC conducted a full judicial review and was convinced that the same 
set of facts regarding Universal and its subsidiaries supported differing Commission decisions 
regarding the Spanish and Italian cartel. 
Moreover, it is difficult to imagine that the GC could have concluded that the Commission’s 
reasoning was sound and that there was not arbitrary application of legal standards after 
conducting a full judicial review of the law and the facts of the case. Following KME such a 
review should have been conducted without using the commission’s margin of discretion as a 
basis for dispensing with the conduct of an in depth review of law and facts.
213
 However, 
considering the GC’s decision it can be argued that the GC did not conduct a full judicial 
review, due to the fact that it disregarded key factors which supported AOI’s appeals. Thus, 
one can argue that the GC in AOI did not follow the KME ruling, but followed its tendency to 
hold the Commission to a very low standard and to strengthen the Commission’s decisions. 
Similarly, in Elf Aquitaine the GC rejected the appeal, whereas in Air Liquide the 
Commission decision was annulled based on arguments which were extremely similar to the 
arguments raised by Elf Aquitaine.
214
 However, in Elf Aquitaine the ECJ annulled the GC’s 
decision based on the fact that the GC had disregarded deficits in the statement of reasons, 
whereas in AOI the ECJ reaffirmed and endorsed the GC’s ruling.215 Moreover, the ECJ 
stated, that the Commission’s explanation could not have invalidated the GC’s interpretation 
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thereof.
216
 However, if the Commission by admitting deficits cannot change the GC’s 
interpretation of a decision, one has to wonder what could change the GC’s interpretation. 
Thus, the problem in the AOI case is the aforementioned tendency of the ECJ to endorse the 
GC’s decisions, which in turn endorses and strengthens the Commission’s decisions, despite 
considerable deficits and obvious arbitrariness. 
Subsequently, the argument can be made that the degree of judicial review conducted in AOI 
should have been found to be insufficient by the ECJ, in the same way as in Elf Aquitaine, due 
to the arbitrary application of the presumption and the overall deficient statement of reasons. 
As mentioned above these arguments are based on the presumption that competition law 
could fall under the hard core of criminal law. However, it has been argued that the 
requirement of full judicial review applies to competition law proceedings regardless of the 
classification those proceedings as hard core or peripheral criminal law.
217
 Thus, it can be 
argued that the judicial review conducted by the GC in AOI does not fulfill the full judicial 
review requirement under Article 6 ECHR and the ECtHR’s case law.218 
In the light of AOI, one can, therefore, make the argument that even after the KME ruling a 
more comprehensive and stringent approach to judicial review is not adopted consistently by 
the GC.  
4. Conclusion 
Throughout this essay it has become clear that following the Menarini judgment Article 6 
ECHR should apply to competition law with full stringency. Thus, based on the severity of its 
fines and their deterrent and punitive nature also competition law of the EU has to be 
considered to fall under Article 6 ECHR. 
Moreover, it has become clear that the presumption of parental liability is in fact not 
rebuttable in practice. The fact that the courts gradually broaden the standards makes it 
virtually impossible for parent companies to adduce “sufficient evidence” to prove those 
standards, in order to rebut the presumption and avoid being held liable as one “undertaking”. 
Moreover, as was discussed in the analysis of this essay, the ECJ and the GC have developed 
a tendency to hold the Commission to a very low standard. 
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The standard applied to the Commission by the courts should be higher, considering the fact 
that the European Commission is the highest competition law authority in Europe. While it is 
reasonable that the Commission has to be afforded some margin of appreciation in its difficult 
task to effectively enforce the competition law of the EU, this margin of appreciation must not 
result in the irrebuttability of the presumption of parental liability. Moreover, the margin of 
appreciation must also not limit the scope of judicial review conducted by the courts, and in 
particular by the GC. Despite the fact that, after the ECtHR’s Menarini ruling, the ECJ in 
KME seemingly advocated a new more comprehensive approach towards judicial review, this 
new approach has not been consistently implemented by the courts after the KME ruling.  
The case of AOI displays the irrebuttability of the presumption of parental liability, as well as 
the insufficient extent of judicial review afforded by the GC. It illustrates how the GC 
reaffirms and strengthens Commission decisions, despite the fact that those decisions are 
based on arbitrary applications of standards as well as flawed reasoning. Moreover, it shows 
that the ECJ itself has developed a tendencies endorse the GC’s judgments and to take cover 
behind the fact that its review is confined to reviewing only the law of cases. Fundamental 
rights arguments are subsequently as ineffective as evidence based arguments in attempting to 
rebut the presumption of parental liability. 
It is often argued that the workload of the GC does not allow full judicial review to be 
conducted. However, the workload of the GC must not come at the expense of judicial review 
and the right to a fair trial. Solutions for the workload problem at the GC have to be 
implemented. One of those solutions could be the establishment of a competition law court, 
pursuant to Article 257 TFEU.
219
 Such a competition court could moreover be set up in a way 
which allowed a closer review of complex economic assessments, which the Commission 
frequently conducts in their decisions.  
The fact that the presumption is practically not rebuttable in conjunction with the fact that the 
courts do not conduct full judicial review raises the question whether parent companies are 
afforded their right to an effective appeal under Articles 6 and 13 ECHR. However, this 
discussion would have led too far with regards to the scope of this essay. 
Personally I think that while competition law has to be effectively enforced by the 
Commission, this has to be done with in certain legal confines. If the ECJ repeatedly 
pronounces the rebuttable nature of the presumption of parental liability it should be 
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rebuttable in practice, rather than in theory. Thus, the erosion of notions such as the “exercise 
of decisive influence” cannot be considered to be compatible with the allegedly rebuttable 
nature of the presumption. Moreover, the judicial review of Commission decisions has to be 
more comprehensive and stringent in order to be compatible with the right to a fair trial. 
Furthermore, such a more stringent and comprehensive approach regarding judicial review 
will have to be implemented and applied consistently, in the light of the future accession of 
the EU to the ECHR under Article 6 TEU. 
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